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On December 17, 1992, the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) after nearly
two years of discussions. One major point of contention during the negotiation
phase was the treatment of labor-related issues, as negotiators consistently resisted
demands to incorporate enforceable worker safety protections within the terms
of the accord. After the talks concluded, the focus shifted to the ratification
process, and efforts began to address labor concerns either through a trilateral
"side agreement" or through U.S. congressional legislation implementing the
accord.
The preamble to the NAFTA gives prominence to labor-related matters:
"The governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States resolved to:
. . . Create new employment opportunities and improve working conditions
and living standards in their respective territories; . . . Protect, enhance and
enforce basic workers' rights . . . ." However, the commitment to labor ends
there. The NAFTA contains no mechanisms to implement, monitor, or enforce
these precatory concepts. Although the NAFTA sets up eight committees and
six working groups to deal with various aspects of the accord, none of these
groups address labor issues.'
Critics complain that the NAFTA will result in the loss of U.S. jobs to Mexico
and the possible weakening of U.S. occupational health and safety standards
absent specific safeguards tied to the NAFTA. They contend that the lure of low
wages and weak enforcement of labor laws by the Mexican Government will prove
irresistible to American businesses seeking ways to cut costs, thus provoking
*Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Washington, D.C.
**Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Washington, D.C.
1. See North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA] annex 2001.2. All refer-
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substantial relocation south of the border.2 For this reason labor groups argue that
receipt of trade benefits should be tied to respect for internationally recognized
workers' rights, including the rights to strike, unionize, bargain collectively, and
enjoy a safe work environment.
No conclusive evidence of the impact the NAFTA will have on U.S. jobs exists.
Most groups agree, however, that some job losses are likely. A report by the
International Trade Commission (ITC), which was touted as the first independent
evaluation of the NAFTA's merit, acknowledges that certain major U.S. indus-
tries such as automobiles and apparel will "experience losses" as a result of the
agreement.3 The report adds, however, that other U.S. industries can be expected
to benefit from the accord, including machine tools, textiles, bearings, industrial
machinery, steel mill products, pharmaceuticals, grains and oil seeds, lumber and
wood products, cotton, and automotive parts.4
President Clinton has vowed to include so-called "side agreements" on labor
and the environment in the NAFTA package he sends to Congress. The labor
agreement would create a commission on labor standards and safety with the
power to require worker education and training, develop minimum health and
safety standards, and adjudicate disputes. The agreement would also require each
country to enforce its own worker health and safety standards. A third side
agreement on "import surges" is also expected to be a part of Clinton's final
NAFTA package. This agreement might provide the President with the ability to
curtail trade benefits under the NAFTA in cases where an unexpected surge in
imports in a given sector displaces large numbers of people. Currently, the
NAFTA links emergency response provisions to cases where imports threaten to
cause substantial injury to a domestic industry, not where increased imports lead
to mass displacement of workers. 5 Finally, Clinton has promised to support the
development of domestic programs to retrain workers who lose their jobs as a
result of the NAFTA.
This article addresses the treatment of labor issues under the NAFTA and
explores the spectrum of views associated with workers' rights under the
agreement. First, it summarizes Mexican labor laws and evaluates chief areas of
concern raised by U.S. labor groups. Second, it explores precedents under U.S.
legislation for linking respect for workers' rights to receipt of trade benefits.
Third, it evaluates Clinton's plan and the other options that exist for attaching
2. Canada, which enjoys a standard of living comparable to the United States, does not incite
these concerns.
3. Potential Impact on the U. S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North American Free-
Trade Agreement, Inv. No. 332-337, U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 2596, at 2-5 (Jan. 1993).
4. A. Nomani, Mexico Is Viewed as the Clear Winner from Free Trade Pact in Study by ITC,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1993, at A2 [hereinafter Mexico is Winner]; Keith Bradsher, Study Says Trade
Pact Will Aid United States Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at DI [hereinafter Study Says].
5. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 8.
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labor safeguards to the NAFTA. Finally, it discusses the precedent these events
may set for future U.S. trade accords.
I. Disparities Between the United States
and Mexico: The Source of the Controversy
Efforts to attach labor safeguards to the NAFTA derive from a concern that
discrepancies between U.S. and Mexican labor markets will lead to accelerated
migration of U.S. businesses to Mexico, thus costing America jobs. This section
analyzes the principal sources of this fear: (1) Mexican laws regulating wages,
hours, and the conduct of unions; and (2) Mexico's pattern of regulating worker
safety.
On paper Mexico's labor laws resemble, and in some cases, surpass those
established in the United States. In contrast to the United States Constitution,
the Mexican Constitution of 1917 contains explicit labor-based protections. For
example, title VI, article 123 of the Mexican Constitution, guarantees the right
to form unions and join professional associations; protects against anti-union
discrimination; sets a maximum normal work day of eight hours and maximum
work week of six days; prohibits forced labor; and provides for maternity leave,
payment of minimum wages, overtime pay, and the right to strike. The govern-
ment has authority to directly enforce these provisions on behalf of workers.
Protections embodied in the Federal Labor Law 6 expand upon the basic rights
contained in the Mexican Constitution. The Law requires notification and concilia-
tion prior to the staging of a strike and sets forth applicable procedures. It also
establishes standards for the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements,
including requirements that all such agreements be in writing and contain stipula-
tions as to the hours of work, rest days, vacation leave, wage rates, and the like.
Mexico's General Regulations for Occupational Health and Safety7 supplement
the Federal Labor Law with regard to worker health and safety matters.' These
regulations create standards substantially equivalent to U.S. legislation. Areas
governed under the regulations include the operation and maintenance of industrial
equipment and the handling, storing, and transporting of toxic, flammable, or
corrosive substances. The regulations also establish requirements for the use of
personal safety equipment to protect the head, ears, face, eyes, body, and limbs.
Finally, the rules set standards for respiratory protection, labeling of radioactive
materials, and workplace temperature, ventilation, lighting, and hygiene.
Additional measures incorporated into Mexico's system of labor protections
include the following:
6. See Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation
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" permanent workers who are fired "without cause" are entitled to additional
severance pay;
" employers are obligated to train their workers;
" discrimination is prohibited on the basis of sex, race, age, religion, political
affiliation, or social standing;
* workers' rights are irrevocable, and any ambiguities in labor standards are
to be construed in favor of workers; 9 and
* the minimum age of employment is fourteen. Workers between the ages of
fourteen and sixteen are subject to special legal protections, including a
requirement that they work shorter hours than adults.10
Mexican law relies principally on conciliation as a means of enforcing these
measures. It establishes federal and state conciliation and arbitration boards (that
is, labor courts) to mediate alleged labor violations." Comprising government,
union, and management representatives, these courts operate on a permanent
basis in each of the thirty-one Mexican states. In addition, a Federal Labor
Court exists to resolve questions regarding the existence and extent of a given
labor-based right and to preside over conciliations in case of a strike.12 Finally,
joint labor-management committees must meet regularly to discuss potential occu-
pational safety and health problems and training issues. 3
Under title VI of the Mexican Constitution federal authorities have exclusive
jurisdiction over most industry-related matters including textiles, electricity gen-
eration, cinematography, rubber, sugar refining, mining metals, steel, petroleum,
petrochemicals, cement, limestone quarrying, automotive manufacturing, chemi-
cals and pharmaceuticals, paper and pulp, vegetable oils and greases, food pro-
cessing, beverage bottling, railroads, lumber and woodworking, glass-making,
and tobacco. The Mexican states are otherwise responsible for enforcing the labor
laws in their respective jurisdictions. 14
Despite the comprehensive nature of Mexico's labor laws, basic deficiencies
persist that form the basis of U.S. labor advocates' concerns under the NAFTA.
The central weaknesses are the chilling effect the Mexican Government's power
to control wages and labor practices can have on the protections discussed above
and Mexico's inadequate enforcement of health and safety standards.
A. GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OVER WAGES AND LABOR PRACTICES
Although the Mexican Constitution guarantees a minimum wage, the daily
average minimum wage in 1991 was only $3.64. The average manufacturing
9. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.-MEXICAN TRADE: PULLING
TOGETHER OR PULLING APART? 77, 78 (1992) [hereinafter OTA Report].
10. Administration's Response, supra note 6, Tab 3.
11. OTA Report, supra note 9, at 78.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Administration's Response, supra note 6, Tab 3; OTA Report, supra note 9, at 78.
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sector wage-although substantially higher at $6.85 per day, or $9.85 per day if
fringe benefits are included-is low by U.S. standards.
1 5
Problems arise as a result of the broad authority the Mexican Government
exerts over union matters. For example, in 1983, when wage reductions led to
14,000 strike petitions, conciliation and arbitration boards generally struck down
these petitions. The government also intervened against striking workers at the
nationwide telecommunications company TelMex in 1984 and 1987, and at the
major airline carrier Mexicana de Aviation in 1982 and 1987. Furthermore, from
1983 to 1988, the Mexican Government used its control over labor unions to bring
real wages down by about 40 percent.1 6
B. INADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 7 Mexico's system
of joint labor-management committees for addressing worker safety concerns,
although in theory a valuable regulatory tool, is hampered by information defi-
ciency, management manipulation, and lack of responsiveness by government
regulators. As a result, Mexican workers may not receive adequate information
about workplace risks and remedial techniques that enable them to participate in
committee proceedings in a meaningful way. Furthermore, employee representa-
tives are often selected by their employers, thus making them potentially reluctant
to criticize management. Finally, government regulators often react slowly to
worker safety complaints that go unresolved through the committee process. The
GAO reports that some state inspection offices "would only respond with an
inspection if committees continued to report the same problems over several
months. "18
The National Safe Workplace Institute, a pro-labor advocacy group, has also
alleged abuses of workplace safety standards such as lack of information on
chemicals used in the workplace, inadequate safeguards on machinery, inadequate
supply of protective clothing and work gear, insufficient training, and threats of
job loss or wage cuts for complaining about workplace conditions.' 9 Reports
such as these have raised concerns that Mexico does not aggressively enforce
occupational safety laws.20
15. Administration's Response, supra note 6, Tab 3, at 11.
16. OTA Report, supra note 9, at 77.
17. Hearing on Implication for Workers of the Fast Track Processes and the Mexican Free Trade
Agreement, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1991) (statement of Franklin Frazier, Dir. of Educ. and
Employment Issues, GAO).
18. Id.
19. NATIONAL SAFE WORKPLACE INSTITUTE, CRISIS AT OUR DOORSTEP: OCCUPATIONAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IMPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO-U.S.-CANADA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1991)
[hereinafter CRISIS AT OUR DOORSTEP].
20. There has not been any comprehensive analysis of Mexican employees' exposure to hazards
in the workplace.
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These concerns have been bolstered by the following anecdotal evidence, which
has received widespread public attention:
* In a federal court action in Texas, a group of Mexican women have alleged
that exposure to hazardous chemicals at an electronics plant in Matamoros,
Mexico, during the 1970s resulted in subsequent miscarriages and birth
defects.21
" During congressional hearings on whether to grant the President fast-track
negotiating authority, a mother testified that inadequate worker protections
caused the death of her sixteen-year-old son, who worked with hazardous
machinery.22
* A Wall Street Journal article profiling the life of a twelve-year-old Mexican
worker revealed that he suffers from coughing, burning eyes, and nausea,
that he attributes to daily exposure to glue fumes on the job.23
C. CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH LABOR-BASED DISPARITIES
NAFTA critics fear that regulatory weaknesses in the Mexican system coupled
with lower wages will encourage U.S. businesses to migrate to Mexico in order
to capitalize on the promise of significantly lower production costs. 24 This fear,
in turn, raises concerns that U.S. officials seeking to dissuade industry flight will
compromise U.S. health and safety standards.25
Some economic analysts have predicted that by the year 2002 the NAFTA could
result in a loss of 220,000 U.S. jobs and give Mexico "a potential trade surplus of
almost $9 billion with the United States.' ,26 The AFL-CIO estimates job losses of
up to 500,000 by the year 2000, in addition to losses of 600,000 in previous years.27
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment has made the following
observations:
Union decline and the globalization of the U.S. economy-of which NAFTA negotia-
tions are a reflection-have hit U.S. workers hard. Imports and offshore production have
21. Rodriguez v. Mallory Capacitory Co., No. 1-92-79 (S.D. Tex.-Brownsville 1991) (case
originated in state court and was removed to federal court on Oct. 29, 1991); see Suit Alleges Exposure
to Chemicals in Electronics Plant Harmed Fetuses, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 576 (Oct. 9,
1991).
22. Economic and Environmental Implications of the Proposed U.S. Trade Agreement with Mex-
ico: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works and the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1991)
(statement of Elizabeth Macias).
23. Matt Moffett, Working Children: Underage Laborers Fill Mexican Factories, Stir U.S. Trade
Debate, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1991, at Al.
24. See, e.g., Howard Metzenbaum, Let's Be Realistic About What NAFTA Will Do to US Jobs,
ROLL CALL, Oct. 5, 1992, at 28.
25. See, e.g., CRIsis AT OUR DOORSTEP, supra note 19, at 3.
26. EcONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE, NAFTA: MAKING IT BETTER 23 (1992) [hereinafter ESI
Report].
27. War of Figures Arises Over Job Gains and Losses from NAFTA, Reuters News Reports, Sept.
11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
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displaced some directly. Displaced manufacturing workers frequently suffer substantial
wage cuts. The future seems especially grim for workers with modest levels of education
attainment and skill.28
Despite these concerns, studies analyzing potential job losses under the NAFTA
are by no means conclusive. The ITC report, for example, surmises that some
U.S. industries will gain while others will be hurt. 29 According to the ITC, sectors
likely to suffer losses include autos, apparel, flat glass, peanuts, shrimp, major
household appliances, certain household glassware, certain fresh and frozen vege-
tables, citrus juice, and fresh-cut roses. On the other hand, U.S. winners would
include machine tools, textiles, bearings, industrial machinery, steel mill prod-
ucts, pharmaceuticals, grains and oil seeds, lumber and wood products, cotton,
and automotive parts.
II. Precedents for Treating Labor Issues in a Trade Context
The inclusion of labor issues in a trade context is not without precedent. Tradi-
tionally, trade treaties themselves have not contained measures addressing work-
ers' rights. For example, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement did not address
labor issues. 30 Likewise, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
has no provisions on labor-related matters. Moreover, efforts to set up a working
group on workers' rights during the Uruguay Round stalled. 31 Nonetheless, sev-
eral pieces of U.S. trade legislation incorporate labor-based concerns.
Congress has enacted at least four pieces of legislation that link the enjoyment
of specific U.S. trade benefits to countries' adherence to fundamental notions of
workers' rights: (1) the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI); 32 (2) the 1984 amend-
ments to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP);3 3 (3) the 1985 amendments
to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act (OPIC); 34 and (4) the Omni-
bus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA).35 The CBI, GSP, and OPIC
measures enable the President to suspend certain nonreciprocal trade benefits
28. OTA Report, supra note 9, at 77.
29. See Mexico Is Winner, supra note 4, at A2, and Study Says, supra note 4, at D1, from which
the following material is drawn.
30. See THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, THE CANADA-U.S. FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT: A SYNOPSIS (1988) (summarizing the provisions of the trade pact).
31. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FUND, IN PURSUIT OF A
WORKING PARTY ON WORKER RIGHTS IN THE CURRENT GATT ROUND ON MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (1988); Theresa A. Amato, Note, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade
Legislation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 79, 91-95 (1990).
32. Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67,97 Stat. 369 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988)).
33. The Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 501, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1988)).
34. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-204,
§ 4, 99 Stat. 1669, 1670 (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
35. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988)).
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offered to eligible developing countries if those countries violate workers' rights.
The OTCA goes further by classifying certain labor rights abuses as unfair trade
practices that are unilaterally actionable under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 and applicable to all U.S. trading partners.
Under the CBI, a condition for continuing beneficiary status is "the degree to
which workers in [the] country are afforded reasonable workplace conditions
and enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively." 36 The GSP program
disqualifies any country that "has not taken or is not taking steps to afford
internationally recognized workers' rights to workers in the country. 37 Workers'
rights as defined include: (1) the right of association; (2) the right to organize
and bargain collectively; (3) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor; (4) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (5)
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, work hours, and
occupational safety and health. 38 The 1985 amendments to the OPIC Act bar the
granting of insurance and financing benefits to companies engaging in business
in countries that are not "taking steps to adopt and implement laws that extend
internationally recognized workers' rights as defined in [the GSP legislation] to
workers in that country." 3 9 Finally, the OTCA amends section 301 of the 1974
Trade and Tariff Act to include nonadherence to the GSP-listed workers' rights
among the "unreasonable or discriminatory" acts that burden U.S. commerce
and thus permit retaliatory measures. 4°
These examples demonstrate that arguments for linking worker protections to
the NAFTA are not completely without precedent.
III. Options for Enhancing the NAFTA's Labor Focus
Although the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States have long
since concluded the NAFTA negotiations, the debate over the need to include
labor-based measures in the final NAFTA package continues. President Clinton
has attempted to enhance the NAFTA's labor protections through the side
agreement on labor. Labor advocates would like even stronger measures. The
following alternatives have been raised by various parties during the congressional
debate over the NAFTA.
A. NEGOTIATE LABOR SAFEGUARDS WITHIN THE NAFTA
One option that labor groups support, but that Clinton has rejected, is to reopen
negotiations "to ensure that the agreement includes specific, enforceable provi-
36. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (1988).
37. Id. § 2462(b)(7).
38. Id. § 2462(a)(4).
39. 22 U.S.C. § 2191a(a)(1) (1988).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
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sions guaranteeing the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining,
and insuring the establishment of appropriate minimum wage structures, neces-
sary health and safety protections, and the elimination of child labor." 41 President
Clinton could model these added provisions after the measures contained in the
GSP legislation and thus make failure to adhere to internationally recognized
workers' rights identified in the GSP legislation an actionable trade violation.
Renegotiation would also permit the parties to reevaluate the dispute resolution
process, which at present does not provide a means of formally challenging a
member country's labor practices. In that context negotiators could discuss
whether revised dispute resolution procedures should allow for private rights of
action. As negotiated, the NAFTA does not permit private parties to raise chal-
lenges before dispute resolution panels. Only the governments of Canada, Mex-
ico, and the United States can initiate such disputes. 42 According to critics, this
limitation deprives the agreement of an important means of holding Mexican
officials accountable for the enforcement of existing laws and leaves too much
opportunity for politics to dictate whether challenges are brought.43
As President Clinton recognized, however, renegotiation would also raise sig-
nificant problems. Mexico could demand concessions on other issues that the
United States would be unwilling or unable to provide. Comments by Mexican
President Salinas have implied that the Clinton administration would not be able
to extract any more concessions out of Mexico unless the United States were to
pay for them. 44 In one instance, for example, President Salinas stated that he
would ask President Clinton for funds to help Mexico restructure its industry to
meet any desired labor standards that became the subject of future discussions.45
Were the NAFTA to be reopened, limiting discussions to labor issues would
be difficult. Furthermore, a consensus on the U.S. side regarding the potential
scope of a labor section does not exist. Moreover, the NAFTA would need to
provide a means to measure its success; yet in the labor context, what that measure
should be is unclear. Finally, to the extent renewed negotiations seek to hold
Mexico accountable to U.S. labor standards as a condition for receipt of certain
trade benefits, serious issues of Mexican sovereignty would arise.
Nonetheless, some members of the United States Congress and labor groups
continue to advocate renegotiation of the NAFTA. Last fall a group of ninety-five
41. Preliminary Report of the LACfor Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy on the NAFTA
Submitted to the President of the U.S., The U.S. Trade Rep., and the Congress of the U.S., at i (Sept.
16, 1992) [hereinafter LAC Report].
42. See NAFTA, supra note 1, chs. 19, 20 (limiting dispute settlement mechanisms to Parties
to the agreement).
43. U.S., Mexico and Canada Plan to Establish Trade Commission, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) Vol.
9, at 1328 (Aug. 5, 1992).
44. NAFTA to Be Initialed Oct. 7in San Antonio, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) Vol. 9, at 1682 (Sept.
30, 1992).
45. Labor Waiting for Clinton to Move on NAFTA, Wash. Trade Daily (TRIG) Vol. 2, No. 248,
at 2 (Dec. 11, 1992).
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House Democrats and one Independent signed a statement recommending that the
NAFTA be rejected and that Clinton renegotiate the agreement to reflect his views
on labor, workers' rights, the environment, and health and safety standards. 46
The congressionally mandated Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations
and Trade Policy on the North American Free Trade Agreement (LAC) shares
that viewpoint. In its summary report on the NAFTA, the LAC urged Congress
to reject the current document. 47 The LAC's position has been largely echoed by
the Alliance for Responsible Trade, a coalition of fifty labor, environmental,
farm, religious, and citizens' organizations aligned against the NAFTA.a8
B. SIDE AGREEMENTS
An alternative approach for treating labor issues without taking the more ex-
treme step of seeking renegotiation of the agreement is to address labor issues in
side agreements outside the NAFTA, as President Clinton has advocated.
President Clinton has made it clear that the final NAFTA package must contain
a side agreement on labor. Contrary to the goals of labor, however, Clinton's
trilateral labor commission would not have the power to impose sanctions or
enforce its decisions. Rather, the commission would act as an oversight agency
with authority to oversee and scrutinize enforcement of labor laws. The commis-
sion would also have the power to solicit information from governments, which
would be obliged to cooperate under the agreement. 49
By stopping short of negotiating a labor commission with enforcement powers,
Clinton avoided potentially troublesome issues of sovereignty. Efforts to add
sanctioning authority by way of the side agreement could have been viewed by
the Mexican Government as a means of appending labor provisions that had been
considered but rejected during negotiation of the NAFTA. The question remains,
however, whether this compromise will be acceptable to Congress. Some mem-
bers of Congress have stated, for example, that they could not approve an
agreement that lacked strict labor enforcement provisions.
C. AMENDING THE NAFTA BY LEGISLATION
Another way of dealing with labor matters would be to seek to attach labor-
based provisions to U.S. domestic legislation that implements the NAFTA. Under
U.S. law an international agreement requires implementing legislation in order
to become effective.50
46. House Democrats Press Clinton to Reject NAFTA and Renegotiate Pact, Inside U.S. Trade
Vol. 10, No. 42, at 1 (Oct. 16, 1992).
47. See LAC Report, supra note 41.
48. Coalition Including Labor Groups Launches Campaign to Defeat NAFTA, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA) No. 243, at A-12 (Dec. 17, 1992).
49. NAFTA Commissions 'Powers Seen as Limited to Oversight Under U.S. Plan, Official Says,
Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 69, at A-7 (Apr. 13, 1993).
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Senator Donald Riegle (D-Mich.) has vowed to press for limited amendments
to the NAFTA. Last year Riegle introduced a resolution that would enable the
Senate to amend the NAFTA in five areas, including monitoring and enforcement
of labor standards and adjustment assistance for displaced U.S. workers. 5 ' House
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) has also indicated that unresolved
workers' rights concerns could be addressed through implementing legislation.52
In order to be viable, however, any NAFTA measures adopted in this manner
should not conflict with terms agreed to between the Parties. Efforts to attach
amendments that do not reflect the provisions of the agreement would violate
U.S. obligations to Mexico and Canada under the accord.
Legislators could look to the preamble in which Canada, Mexico, and the
United States express a commitment to workers' rights as authority for labor-based
amendments. However, this approach would not provide the basis for imposing
new obligations on Mexico and Canada. Rather, Congress would be limited to
creating domestic programs devoted to labor concerns. Moreover, efforts to
unilaterally condition Mexico's receipt of trade benefits on its enforcement of
workers' rights would go beyond the NAFTA as negotiated and raise issues of
invasion of Mexican sovereignty.
Congress could, consistent with the NAFTA, create a worker readjustment
program to help retrain U.S. workers who lose their jobs as a result of the
agreement. Support for such a program appears widespread. Prior to leaving
office, for example, former President Bush called for a five-year, $15 billion fund
to retrain workers who lose their jobs due to technological change or foreign
competition.53 A portion of this fund would have helped those expected to be hurt
by the NAFTA. Under Bush's plan eligible workers would have received $3,000
in training vouchers. Additionally, those who had exhausted unemployment com-
pensation benefits would have received living allowances for up to two years.
Clinton also advocates a worker training and adjustment assistance program,
although as of this writing he had not presented the details of his plan.54
One of the key issues will be how to fund such a program. Clinton has discussed
a proposal under which businesses would set aside at least 1.5 percent of their
payroll to finance the program. 55 Representative Gephardt, in contrast, has recom-
mended a "cross-border transaction tax" of up to 5 percent on products moving
across the U.S.-Mexico border to help pay for worker training and other environ-
51. Riegle Promises to Change Fast-Track Rules, Open NAFTA to Senate Amendments, Inside
U.S. Trade Vol. 10, No. 42, at 17 (Oct. 16, 1992).
52. Riegle, Other Senators Will Press for Change in Fast-Track Rule on NAFTA, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) Vol. 9, at 1443 (Aug. 19, 1992).
53. Michael Kranish & Peter G. Gosselin, Bush Offers $15b Training Plan for Jobs, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1992, at 1.
54. Clinton Calls for Supplementary NAFTA Pacts on Environment, Labor, Inside U.S. Trade,
Special Report, Oct. 9, 1992 [hereinafter Clinton Calls].
55. Kranish & Gosselin, supra note 53, at 1 (also discussing Clinton's proposal).
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mental and infrastructure development programs.5 6 Gephardt cites the transi-
tional, worker adjustment, and regional assistance policies of the European Com-
munity as models for how to proceed under the NAFTA.
There appears to be broad support for programs that emphasize U.S. domestic
policies as a means of promoting economic stability and offsetting any ill effects
the NAFTA may have on labor markets. Comprehensive studies conducted in the
wake of the agreement by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) and the Economic Strategy Institute (ESI)57 both focus on domestic strate-
gies. The ideas and underlying conclusions contained in the OTA and ESI reports
are in harmony with the general views advocated by Clinton.
The OTA concludes that the NAFTA will likely result in lower U.S. wages
and labor standards and the diversion of investment from the United States to
Mexico unless economic and social-based reforms are implemented. 5' Suggested
reforms would focus on increasing U.S. productivity, reaffirming workers' rights
to organize and bargain collectively, and reducing the gap between rich and
poor. Other OTA recommendations include discouraging state and local "bidding
wars" to recruit new industry-a tactic that can compromise health and safety
standards-by threatening to reduce federal funding for economic development
and by undertaking parallel measures on labor and the environment that would
establish concrete binational goals and ensure adequate funding sources. Worker
retraining programs should receive particular attention in light of the OTA's
conclusion that those most likely to lose their jobs as a result of the NAFTA do
not possess the skills that new NAFTA-created jobs will require.
The ESI similarly stresses the need to create a "high skill, flexible domestic
work force" at home.59 "Such concepts as certifying the skills of new workers,
promotion of closer links between firms, a technology extension service similar
to the agriculture extension service, comprehensive trade adjustment assistance,
and the discouragement of bidding wars by states and localities trying to recruit
new industries must be adopted and implemented. "6 The ESI Report also chal-
lenges the results of studies that predict no net effect or some net benefits from
the NAFTA.6' The ESI argues that those studies were performed prior to the
56. Gephardt Wants Cross-Border Tax to Aid Labor, Environmental Problems, U.S.-Mex. Free
Trade Rep. (Thompson-Lesser) Vol. 2, No. 4, at 3 (Aug. 10, 1992).
57. ESI is a Washington, D.C., based economic think tank.
58. OTA Report, supra note 9, ch. 1.
59. ESI Report, supra note 26, at 3.
60. Id. at 27.
61. Studies critiqued include: Clopper Almon, Industrial Effects of a Free Trade Agreement
Between Mexico and the USA, an INFORUM report for the U.S. Department of Labor (Mar. 5,
1991); U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REVIEW OF TRADE INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION
MEASURES AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS, PHASE II (1990);
POLICY ECONOMIC GROUP, KPMG PEAT MARWICK, THE EFFECTS OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND MEXICO (1991); RAUL HINOJOSA-OJEDA & SHERMAN ROBINSON, ALTERNA-
TIVE SCENARIOS OF U.S.MEXICO INTEGRATION: A COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH
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conclusion of the NAFTA and were based on the false assumptions of full employ-
ment and perfect markets.62
Not surprisingly, a principal obstacle to realizing the domestic programs envi-
sioned by the OTA and the ESI is finding the funds with which to finance them.
This potential roadblock, however, arises whenever a change of policy is recom-
mended. The concepts stressed are functionally sound: at this stage, the United
States should focus more on long-term structural changes at home rather than on
measures that might compromise Mexican sovereignty.
D. RELIANCE ON ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING NATIONAL LAWS
President Clinton's strategy also stresses enforcement of national laws. "[T]he
agreement does nothing to reaffirm our right to insist that Mexicans follow their
own labor standards. 63 In the context of workers' rights this means enforcement
of occupational health and safety standards on both sides of the border.
The tough issue that persists is to what extent the United States could retaliate
if Mexico fails to comply adequately with its commitments under Mexican laws.
Efforts to restrict Mexican imports under a "carrot and stick" approach absent
a renegotiation of the NAFTA's terms would constitute a breach of the agreement.
An alternative proposal might be to offer U.S. financial and technical assistance
to Mexico on the condition that Mexico steps up enforcement of its health and
safety standards.
E. PROVIDING FOR EMERGENCY SUSPENSION WHERE
IMPORTS THREATEN WORKER DISPLACEMENT
President Clinton's side agreement on import surges would grant the President
the authority to suspend tariff benefits under the NAFTA where unexpected
import surges threaten to displace large numbers of U.S. workers. 64 Currently,
the NAFTA contains more traditional emergency action provisions permitting
temporary tariff increases where, as a result of the agreement, imports of a good
have increased to such an extent as to threaten serious injury to a domestic industry
producing the same or similar good.65 Clinton's plan would provide a safeguard
should forecasts of mass worker displacement prove accurate. At this stage,
however, the likelihood of such displacement is uncertain at best.
(Dep't of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, Working
Paper No. 609, 1991); and GARY HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOTT, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE (1992). ESI Report, supra note 26, at 8-9.
62. ESI Report, supra note 26, at 21.
63. Clinton Calls, supra note 54.
64. Bush, Mulroney, Salinas Sign NAFTA, Wash. Trade Daily Vol. 2, No. 253, at 1 (Dec. 18,
1992).
65. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 8.
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IV. Conclusion
Like trade agreements that have preceded it, the NAFTA as negotiated fails to
contain labor safeguards. Moreover, President Clinton's side agreement on labor
does not condition receipt of trade benefits on recognition of workers' rights. Yet,
despite these shortfalls, labor groups have made substantial advances.
Workers' rights issues have received far more emphasis than ever before.
Although long-standing precedent in U.S. legislation conditions favorable trade
treatment on respect for certain internationally recognized workers' rights, the
NAFTA represents the first time the dialogue has produced significant inroads
in the context of an internationally negotiated trade instrument. Some members
of Congress, for example, have promised to introduce labor-related amendments
to the legislation that implements the NAFTA. President Clinton has also commit-
ted to a host of measures that would make the NAFTA more responsive to
workers' rights.
As a result of this attention the final NAFTA package will likely contain
significant labor-based protections. However, the final package can be expected
to rely heavily on unilateral domestic programs as a means of providing proper
safeguards as opposed to a "carrot and stick" approach that seeks to compel
cooperation from Mexico.
Whatever outcome prevails, the final NAFTA package will likely set the tone
for any future trade agreements, beginning with negotiations with other Western
Hemisphere nations. Before leaving office, former President Bush spoke of creat-
ing a NAFTA that extends beyond the borders of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States to the countries of Central and South America. 66 Caribbean countries have
already begun to push for "parity" with the NAFTA through amendments to
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 67 As with Mexico, these countries' labor
protections and wages vary substantially with those of the United States. Should
the CBI countries succeed, the labor-related precedents under the NAFTA could
become the model. Ultimately, this pattern of expanding free trade could lead to
the direct incorporation of worker safeguards and enforcement authority into
international trade instruments.
66. Supra note 64.
67. Caribbean Countries Push for "Parity" with NAFTA, Wash. Tariff& Trade Letter Vol. 12,
No. 48, at 2 (Dec. 7, 1992).
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